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Prologue 
The predominant characte ristic of the mathematician , 
a s  the write r se e s  him , is that of unre st , fo r the math­
e matician is never fully satisfied. To illustrate , he 
acc e pt s  the challenge offered by a prob lem new to him. 
Until he se e s  the s oluti on to the prob lem in entirety,  
he is tense , anxious. After the problem has b e e n  s olve d , 
c alm is re stored and the thrill of a c c omplishment supplants 
the former tensene s s. Offhand , then , it would ap pear 
that the mathematician at this stage is satisfied and can 
l e an back in his chair. c ontented. Before long , howeve r ,  
h e  meets another problem , acce pts the challe nge , and 
again f e e ls tensions which will be re solved only when 
the problem is re solved in his own mind. He begin s  to 
s uspec t  that after the present c hallenge the re will be 
another, and then another. 
What , then , leads the mathematician on? What doe s  
h e  hope to accompli sh? Why does awarene s s  of a new prob­
lem-si tuat�on invite c onsiderati on on his part , rather 
than reje ction? What is the mathematician trying to do? 
In the f ir st pla c e , a problem by its very nature 
s ugge sts an inc ompletene s s , a lack , someth ing missing. 
The mathematic ian , disc onte nted with puz z l e s  not compl etely 
f i tte d togethe r ,  finds himself searching for a pattern 
in order that he may di s c ove r the missing pie c e s .  Not 
happy vdth isolate d statements , he strive s to establish 
relationship s among the statements. Finally , by infer­
e nc e s  drawn from the relationships discovered , he s e e s  
the solution and consequently the entire pattern. An 
admiration for "wholeness" then, partly explains the drive 
activating the mathematician. 
In addition, the mere realization of the presence of 
a challenge invites action from anyone so geared. That is, 
such a person feels that he � accept the challenge pre­
sented to him. To ignore the challen�e is unthinkable. 
Similarly, the story is told that a mountain-climber, asked 
to analyze his reasons for scaling a particular mountain, 
explained that he had to climb the mountain simply because 
the mountain was there. The presence of the mountain con­
stituted the challenge, finding the best manner in which 
to scale the mountain was the problem, and making the actual 
climb would prove his acceptance of the challenge. 
Besides revealing a yearning for "wholeness" and a 
desire to meet headlong any challenging situation, the 
mathematician shows a keen responsiveness to beauty. For 
one thing, he finds beauty in a perfectly constructed proof. 
True, the ordered symmetry of the proof may not be at all 
apparent to one whose eye and mind are not so attuned. 
However, lack of awareness of beauty on the part of some 
people does not mean the proof holds no attractiveness 
for anyone. Thus, one piece of land may belong to a Mr. 
Jackson, the adjoining piece may belong to a Mr. Reeves, 
but the landscape belongs to whoever has the eye to behold 
it. 
The mathematician sees beauty not only in the proof 
before him, but also in the reasoning which has produced 
the proof. Clear-cut ideas, precisely and forcefully 
expressed, are interestin_r:; in themselves, thereby 
attracting the mathematician's attention and evoking 
his admiration. 
ttowever, the aspect of the mathematician's life 
that is probably most often sliFi.:hted in appraisals is 
his creativeness. For instance, in solving a problem or 
in proving a theorem he has constructed something, a 
whole out of what were disorganized segments. By ex­
amining the segments, by visualizing a pattern connecting 
them, and by supplying missing parts, he has built a 
structure, an idea resting on a firm foundation of logical 
reasoning. Moreover, the idea so structured is acce'.'.:'t­
able, indeed irresistible, to anyone subscribing to the 
assumptions on ·,;hich the reasoning is based. He may ex­
press his creativeness in attacking a familiar relation­
ship froa a new point of view; he may pose a challenging 
problea to his students, his colleagues, or his family; 
or, if he is one of a privileged few, he may have the 
happy experience of building up by induction a theorem 
heretofore not guessed by anyone. 
Whether the mathematician's efforts are examined for 
a spects of "wholeness", beauty, or creativeness, one fact 
must surely be noted. In common with the work of scholars 
in other fields, his work evidences a search for truth, 
or rather, a search for what he conceives to be truth. 
In his attempts to discover truth, though, he realizes 
that he will never fully succeed. After all, as that 
d iscerning mathematician, Edson H. Taylor, has remarked, 
"The search for truth is an infinite process." The 
mathematician, teased by a question that vdll not leave 
him alone, applies resources of ingenuity, concentration, 
a nd far-sightedness to getting the answer. By the time 
the one question has been dealt with to his satisfaction, 
other questions have arisen, each just as insistent as 
the first. 
Sometimes, in his search for answers, he has had 
the thrill of getting sudden, totally unexpected insight 
into the problem at hand. That is, he may have grasped 
immediately the very relationship pointing to the solution, 
when he had ,!!21 previously worked out the pertinent steps. 
Then too, it is just possible that, when involved in 
proving a theorem, he has seen in a "flash", so to speak, 
what step he should take next. Since the mathematician 
attributes both of these exciting flashes of understand­
ing to intuition, he may, in the course of his adventures, 
find himself wondering about intuition and subsequently 
hunting for explanations. 
vhapter I 
Introduction to Intuition 
Down through the ages, in all places and at all times, 
man has been seeking truth. At times truth has stood 
maddeningly close, yet has eluded capture. At other times, 
despite endless efforts with test-tube and beaker, with 
Geiger counter and atom-smasher, it has stood aloof, un­
reachable. On still other occasions, for brief moments, 
it has appeared tractable, even attainable. 
Thus history has witnessed Abraham following the dir­
ection of an invisible god into a promised land, Euclid 
applying with vigor his powers of or�anization, and Omar 
Khayyam, despite emphasis on the here-and-now, looking 
for order in algebra. Still later arises Spinoza, who, 
in his seclusion, searches for answers to the insistent 
question of what constitutes knowledge. 
In addition to considering � is true, man has 
been teased by the puzzle of explaining .h,2!! he knows a 
particular belief to be true. Accordingly, he may ascribe 
an idea to intuition. That is, he may have had the ex­
perience of "knowing", when he had not previously come 
across evidence that would "prove" his idea to be true. 
Perhaps now is the time to bring out a point often over­
looked, that the lack of proof does not necessarily in­
d icate that a statement is false, or even doubtful. As 
an extreme example, it is conceivable that a person might 
be unable to supply any testimony or record of his birth. 
Thus he could not prove, in a legal sense, that he had 
1. 
2. 
ever been born. A few years ago a Syrian lecturer lampooned 
the American emphasis on birth certificates. Apparently in 
Syria the mere presence of the person was considered evidence 
enough of the fact of birth. 
In addition to intuition there are three other ways 
of knowing, 'Which will be examined in a moment. Let us 
think of the ways of knowing as the rungs of a ladder with 
the most honored, reliable method at the top. Obviously 
proof occupies the topmost rung. At the other extreme, 
and there may well be argument, we are going to place 
intuition. No attempt will be made to assign authoritz 
and experiment to definite rungs, as the dependability of 
either of these hinges upon the care -"11th which it is used. 
For instance, upon examining authority as a method of 
knowing facts, probably the most serious consideration lies 
in what one is willing to call an authority. What are his 
credentials? Is he recognized as an authority by people 
whose opinion can be respected? Is he a "self-styled" 
authority? The fact that.his statements have been pub­
lished does not make him an authority. Yet frequently 
gullible people are willing to accept the most outlandish 
claims, simply because such claims have been published. 
Such people will believe everything from the label on a 
patent-medicine bottle to an august pronouncement that the 
world is about to end. 
Furthermore, the fact that a person speaks or writes 
in a self-assured manner does not make him an authority. 
J. 
Indeed, much self-assurance results from too little in­
formation, or from knowledge about only one aspect of a 
s ubject. Even the fact that a man is regarded highly by 
t he scholars of the day as a recognized authority does not 
mean that he is in possession of absolute truth. For ex­
ample, Aristotle was for centuries deemed .!ill!. source of 
information on anatomy and almost any other subject as 
well. According to legend, if a mediaeval teacher were 
dissecting a dog for the benefit of his anatomy class, and 
if one of the dog's organe did not comply with what was 
written in Aristotle's book, the dog was wrong1 
Another limitation to using authority as a way to 
support arguments is the fact that although a man may 
have convinced himself that the authority he is naming 
really is such, the person with 'W'hom he is debatin� may 
not accept that same source as reliable. Consider for 
a moment the task of trying to convince a Buddhist of 
Christian beliefs by quoting the Bible. Apparently, for 
any individual, an authority is any source that, for various 
reasons, he accepts as sound; consequently, he u ses the 
source both to gain new information and to support opinions 
that to him seem valid. 
As to the matter of experiment, there seem to be at 
least four weaknesses or limitations. First, and this 
requirement surely could not be over-stressed, is the con­
dition that the experimenter must assure himself that he is 
controlling all but one factor. Otherwise he cannot know 
that the result obtained has stemmed from the one con­
dition for which he is testing. Another difficulty lies 
in attempting to duplicate conditions in a series of ex­
periments. If the experimenter is not extremely cautious 
in this respect, he lvill be unable safely to draw a gen­
eralization from his result. In the third place, there is 
the liability of his concluding more than what has actually 
been established. As an illustration, suppose a hybrid 
black guinea pig were mated to another hybrid black one. 
On authority of those who have conducted the experiment, 
there is a strong probability that one-fourth of the off­
spring will be white, the others, black. Suppose a man 
not conversant with the lawa of heredity were to look at 
the two black parents, look at the offspring, regard es­
p ecially the black ones, and conclude that all the black 
ones were hybrid with respect to color of coat. Such a 
conclusion would appear nreasonable", as the presence of 
the white offspring would lead him to think that the black 
ones could not be pure-line black. However, this is a 
false conclusion, for actually any one of the black off­
spring might be pure-line black, a point that would be 
settled if the study were carried through to the extent 
of crossing a black one with one that was known to be 
hybrid with respect to color. The occurrence of no white 
ones in the third generation thus produced would indicate 
definitely that the questionable parent was pure-line. 
Thus, to get back to the original pair considered, the 
5. 
conclusion drawn by the man was unsound. In swmnation, 
all that he had actually established was that crossing a 
particular black male guinea pig with a particular black 
female guinea pig yielded offspring, some of '41.ich '1vere 
black, others, white. That one fact was all that he had -
ascertained as a result of that particular experiment. 
A fourth limitation in the use of experiment is the 
obvious fact that one cannot test all cases. At first 
glance, some may be surprised at the mention of anything 
so readily apparent. However, as one cannot test all cases 
having like conditions, one cannot determine the results 
f or all cases. Hence one cannot know through experimentation -
that a certain set of conditions yields a certain result 
for all cases. -----
Although it is impossible to test all cases, it is 
possible, nevertheless, to establish the validity of a 
formula by the process of mathematical induction. This 
process, which consists of only two steps, will be re­
viewed by making reference to the formula involving com-
n 
p ound interest. The fcrmula, A == P(l + r) , gives the 
amount A to which an origina.l principal P would accumulate 
in n years if invested at an interest rate r, compounded 
annually. Since the interest is compounded, there is a 
new principal at the beginning of each successive year. 
It is easy to see that, at the beginning of the second 
year, the new principal will be (P +Pr ) , which equals 
6. 
P (l + r) . Thus , at the beginning of the third ye ar , the 
new princ i pal wil l  be P(l + r) -t- P(l + r)r ,  whic h ,  when 
� 
s implifi ed , be c ome s P(l+ r) • By a similar ar�ume nt , 
t he new princ ipal at the beginnin� of the fourth ye ar can 
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b e  shown t o  be equal to P ( 1 + r} , • However, the formula 
has b e en t e st ed only in those c as e s  in which n is e qual t o  
1, 2, or 3. It i s  un safe to assume at this juncture that 
t he formula will hold for all int egral n .  
The s olut i on t o  thi s dilemma li e s  in applyin� the 
pro c e s s  that i s  terme d  mathemat i cal inducti on. Fi rst of 
all , the formula i s  a s sume d to be valid for some value of 
n ,  for inst anc e , for n e qual to s .  The imme diat e  goal i s  
t o  show t h e  exi stence of an inheritan c e  propert y ,  namely , 
t hat the va lidity of the formula for n equal t o  s impli e s  
t he validity of the c o rre sponding formula for the suc c e ed­
i ng integral va lue , s + l .  Thus , we as sume that at the end 
s. 
of s year s , the ac cumulat i on i s  P(l+ r) . Sinc e , during 
s 
t he next ye ar , the intere st earned wi ll be P ( l+r) r ,  at 
the end of (s + 1) year s , the t ot al amount c an be shown to 
b e  P(l + r)s�i , which establi shes the inheritan c e  property . 
Onc e  the all-important i nhe ritan c e  pronert y has b e en e s­
t abli she d ,  one can a s sume t hat , if the formula i s  veri­
fied for some spe c i fi c  value of n ,  usually for n e qual to 
1, then the formula is likewi se true for the c a se in which 
n is equal to the next succ e ssive integer . Of course , this 
la st statement is tantamount t o  saying that the formula 
holds for all n. Usually , howeve r ,  the verifi c ation for 
7. 
a specific value is established first; then, the inher­
itance property is shown to exist. Hence, althou�h not 
all cases can be tested, certain formulas can be established 
by mathematical induction. 
In general, the validity of any proposition is rec­
ognized most readily, if the proposition has been proved • 
.tiuilt upon a foundation of certain stateroo nts deemed ac­
ceptable, a proof proceeds along the lines decreed by logic, 
step by step, to an unequivocal conclusion. T hus, he who 
subscribes to the statements on which the proof is con­
structed is necessarily convinced of the tttruth" of the 
conclusion. characterized by a high degree of reliability 
and certainty, therefore, the method of proof deservedly 
occupies the position of greatest honor, the topmost rung. 
When using this method, one must be sure, if the proof is 
to be rigorous, that every step can be supported by some­
thing previously accepted. That is, each step must be sub­
stantiated by a proof already established, by a definition, 
or by an assumption, together with correct application of 
the rules pertaining to logical inference. Moreover, even 
before attempting to outline theproof, the student meets a 
sizable hurdle. That is, he has the responsibility of 
seeing to it that he does not introduce special conditions. 
To put it differently, he must determine that he does not 
assume any conditions other than those specifically stated 
by the hypotheses. This careless intrusion of special con­
ditions is particularly dangerous at the staP.;e when he starts 
to make a drawing. For instance, if the hypotheses of a 
theorem in tenth-grade geometry mention a parallelogram, 
the student, in making an illustration, must not draw a 
rectangle, as the rectangle is a special type of parallel­
ogram. If the student were to draw a rectangle, he would 
be assuming that he was to deal with perpendicular lines 
and ninety-degree angles. That is, he would be guilty of 
having intruded special conditions, conditions neither ex­
plicitly stated nor even implied in the hypotheses. 
In these remarks, it is hoped that a groundwork for 
the study of intuition has been laid. In laying such ground­
work, we have presented intuition as one of four ways of 
knowing. Having dealt with the limitations of three of the 
ways, we shall venture next into a discussion of the mysteries 
of intuition itself. 
Chapter II 
Characteristics of Intuition 
Probably the most formidable deterrent to the study 
of intuition is the difficulty of definition. At the 
outset the impossibility of defining the term with exact­
ness is asserted; arguments to support this assertion 
will now be outlined. Later, the characteristics of intu­
ition will be noted and examined in some detail. 
For one thing, the abstractness of the term makes 
precise definition difficult. Invisible, inaudible, and 
most certainly intangible, intuition does not lend itself 
to the type of detailed observation possible with concrete 
objects. That is, the student of intuition cannot examine 
his subject as he might inspect, for instance, a picture, 
a musical composition, or a rose. Since the properties 
are of an elusive quality, they prevent proper classi­
fication, a prerequisite to definition. Of course, 
abstractness alone does not imply the impossibility of 
definition, but surely at best such a condition makes the 
task of defining an imposing one. 
A far stronger argument against definition lies in 
the fact that what is intuitively obvious to one may not 
1 
be, to another. That is, if the application of a con-
cept is familiar to a man, he is apt to give that concept 
1. Hans HahnJ.. "Geometry and Intuition", Scientific American (April, 1�54), CXC, 84 ff. 
9. 
intuitive status. A fact intuitively clear to a mechanic 
might be known to another only as a c onclusion derived 
from the most involved reasoning. A relationship g rasped 
immediately by a mathematician might never be suspected 
b y  another. An observation ascribed to intuition by 
a botanist might well be questioned by the uninitiated. 
Since there is room for vast disagreement as to just 
what ideas may be known by intuition, it follows that in­
t uition itself cannot be categorized or pi�eon-holed in 
an unimpeachable manner. Hence the term intuition de­
fies definition. 
Although the term remains undefined, or perhaps 
because of the very lack of precise definition, it is 
imperative that intuition at least be described. 
Accordingly, as intimated in the first paragraph, several 
characteristics will be viewed. 
In the first place, intuition is not diametrically 
opposed to reason. Yor example, the personnel mana�er of 
an industrial firm finds himself confronted with eleven 
applications for a particular job. tte will conduct a short 
interview with each applicant with the object of eliminating 
e ir;ht of the hopefuls. At almost the first glance, 
and after the sli�htest exchange of words, he will have 
judged which eight will be unsuited to the work. lntu­
i tion has at least helped in forming the i'irst judgments. 
�hat is, the man "feels" that a particular three will be 
well-suited to answering the demands of the job. At the 
next stage, the most careful reasoning must be employed. 
The personnel manager must sort through several different 
kinds of evidence, such as the ratings of fo rmer employers, 
judgments pertaining to the applicant's character, and 
considered opinions as to personality traits, such as 
promptness, dependability, initiative, and cooperativeness. 
All evidence he must weigh carefully in the hopes of choosing 
the best of the remaining three. Thus intuition plus care­
ful reasoning guide his selection. 
As another instance, a student has been assigned a 
theorem to prove. He observes not only all facts given 
in the hypothesis, but also the relationship he is to prove. 
By reasoning, he determines the validity of each step, but 
which step to take next is often indicated by intuition. 
Again, logical reasoning has worked alongside intuition to 
produce results. 
Although intuition and logical reasoning may operate 
simultaneously in the solution of a problem, intuition can 
be described as a way of getting ideas without words, a 
short cut to knowledge. Understandably then, a person 
challenged to support a view known intuitively will be at 
a loss for words to explain how he knows • 
............ 
Furthermore, intuition is possibly almost the only way 
of reasoning employed by those people who have given no 
1 
study to the subject of reaching conclusions. Those who 
have never given thought to deduction as a way of drawing 
inferences continually make "snap judgments", not neces­
sarily false; seemingly, such persons do not fall back 
on logic to defend their views. 
The reference just made to the fact that "snap judg-
ments" are not always incorre ct suggests a point that can 
hardly be stressed too much, namely, that intuitive rea­
soning is not necessarily weak or faulty. For instance, 
there is the trite case of the wife who warns her husband 
against having business dealings with a man she has just 
met. When pressed for reasons, she asserts only that she 
knows the would-be business associate cannot be trusted. 
Of course, the concluding portion of such a tale always 
depicts the wife's predictions fulfilled and the husband's 
undying gratitude for having been warned in time. 
In addition, intuition is usually a satisfRctory 
guide in reaching conclusions to the extent that things 
seem to be as they are. Thus the student, upon inspecting 
a pair of interacting strai�ht lines for the first time, 
intuitively concludes that the vertical angles are equal. 
The vertical angles appear to be equal; they� eoual. 
1. The phrase "intuitive reasoningn may be paradoxi cal 
to some; that is, some observers may with vehemence claim 
that if a fact be intuitively known, then that fact cannot 
have stemmed from reasoning. If the ter� reasoning gives 
difficulty, perhaps intuition can be thought of as a faculty 
of the human mind which acts outside the realm £! conscious-
�· 
In situations in which appearances are deceiving, 
however, intuition can mi slead, as in the case of optical 
illusions. A notable instance of such misleadinR is found 
in the belief formerly held that the earth was flat. Such 
a view of the earth is reasonably consistent with what one 
observes and is therefore understandable. Hence intuition 
is reliable only in those instances in which a situation 
appears to be the way it actually is. 
All knowledge gained intuitively has been obtained in 
one of two ways, either by sense intuition or by intellec­
t ual intuition. In this discussion, sense intuition shall 
mean a situation such as the following. With reference 
a gain to the two intersecting straight lines, a person re­
garding the lines realizes the vertical angles formed are 
e qual. The fact that such a relationship can be proved 
does not add to sureness. His realization that the vertical 
angles are equal is a fact known by sense intuition, the 
sense concerned being that of sight. It has been found that 
many people limit the use of the word intuition to designating 
the sense type only. 
An example of intellectual intuition, as the term is 
understood by the writer, can be found in problem-solving. 
At a certain step in the work, the problem-solver, upon 
e xamining the data already assembled, sees two possible 
avenues to follow. Without resorting to trial-and-error, 
he decides his plan of action. Such a plan, it seems, can 
b e  said to be known by intellectual intuition , for none 
o f  hi s sense s have played a major part in his re aching a 
d e c ision . 
Lit• 
It is only natural that the lack of pre c i se definition 
h a s  result ed in a confusion regarding the use of the term ,  
intuition .  Since the word i s  apparently frequently mis­
u sed , a discussion of the kinds of mi suse may, b y  c ontrast , 
c larify c orre ct usage . We are alluding t o  the practice 
of using the word intuition as a c over-up for a belief 
or a prejudice that c annot actually b e  proved . A cas e in 
p oint c onc erns an incident) factual, by the way , in which 
a l ady sought to reinforce her b e lief in the superiority 
of the white rac e over other rac e s  by statin� that such 
a view was intuit ively held and obviou sly valid . When 
a sked t o  supply document ary evidenc e, all she c ould do 
was to fall back on the usual meaningle s s  cliche s plus 
her personal int erpretation of intuition. 
A similar instance of misuse deal s wit h the employer 
who st eadfastly refuse s to hire what he terms a fore igner. 
It may be that t o  him , a foreign er is anyone whose name 
i s  not Anglo-Saxon . However that may be , when que stione d 
on his policie s ,  he as sert s vehemently that the wisdom of 
his action should be c lear by intuition. Clearly he is 
implying that , if anyone que stions his viewpoint , the 
f ault cannot lie in the employe r's attitude , but rather in 
the challenge r's intuitive powers. 
Although the re as suredly are in stanc es when intuition 
may be at fault , there i s  enc ouragement i n  the thought that 
i ntuitive power s can po s s ibly be improve d. Some do not 
a c c ept the pos sibility of such improveme nt; such skept i c s  
maz c onsider their po sition somewhat weakened by the account 
of a c lass conducted by the General E lect ric C ompany several 
1 
years ago . Enrolled in a c our se ca lled "prac tical engine er-
i ng" ,  the twenty c ollege graduates spent c lass se s sions t el­
l ing one another the ir hunche s ,  just as they thought of them . 
The act of explaining their ideas t o  others helped clarify 
t heir own thinking,  initiat e d  by the hunc hes , whi ch , in turn , 
were sugge sted by intuiti on. Alt hough c lass ses si on s  were 
characterized by di scus sion , the t ime out side cla s s  was 
c haracterized by act i o n ,  and plent y  of it. That i s ,  out side 
t he classroom , the student s performed what ever operat i ons 
were indi cated in order to c arry out the ir hunche s .  The 
t angible result of the cours e  was a formi dab le number of 
i nvent ions useful t o  the c ompany . Moreover , the ac compli sh­
ment s of the c lass are all the more int ere st ing in vi e w  of 
the fact that some of tho se enrolled had n ever invented 
anything before. 
Reactions to this ac count are bound to vary great ly. 
The spon sors of the c lass enthusiast i c ally point out the 
imposing array of "f i r st invent i ons" . Ac c ording t o  the 
sponsor s , the student s' invention s  we re based on intu­
itive ly-obt ained hunche s .  The produc t i on of such inventi ons 
prove s , they reason , that the method s of c ond uct ing the 
1. c. G. Suit s ,  "Heed That Hunch" , Amer i c an Magazine 
(De c ember , 1945), CXL, 142. 
class had developed or broadened the students' intuitive 
powers. Their opponents might claim, on the other hand, 
that the sponsors had succumbed to the rrpost hoc" fallacy. 
It is just possible that those enrolled in the class would 
have carried out their inventions, even if they had not 
e ver been members of the "practical engineering" class. 
In other words, perhaps the sponsors had cited a cause-
effect relationship that was not valid. 
Those who accept the premise that a broadening of in­
tuitive powers is possible will naturally wonder just what 
factors are conducive to such broadening. More explicitly, 
what traits or habits can be developed in order to achieve 
such a goal? One writer suggests, among other thin�s, train-
ing oneself in alertness, sensitivity, and discipline of mind. 
The mention of these three undoubtedly worthy aids makes 
the improvement of intuitive powers sound far from an easy 
task. Another observer is more specific, for he says out­
right that one's interests should be broadened, in order 
2 
that intuition can be supplied with plenty of material. 
seemingly, the more varied the experiences, the greater the 
possibility of insight into a given situation. 
Furthermore, one should learn not to distrust a new 
idea simply because it is foreign; rather, one should welcome 
the new idea. As an illustration, a student, after several 
1. John Kord Lagemann, "You're Smarter Than You Think", 
Reader's Digest (March, 1952 ), LI, 40. 
2 .  c. G. Suits, "Heed That Hunch", American Magazine 
(December, 1945), CXL, 143. 
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unsuc c e s sful bout s with a formi dable problem , may be on t he 
v erge of despai r . Pe rhaps at that very moment a radi c ally 
d ifferent approach o c curs to him . If he i s  wi se , he will 
n ot summari ly di smi s s  t he new thought as ri di c ulous or 
illogi cal . Aft er a ll , in order to solve hi s problem, he 
may need an e nt i re ly new vie w; perhaps he nee ds an " over­
v iew'' . On the chance that h i s  new slant wi ll lead t o  the 
i n s i ght requi site for suc c e s s , he s hould study the rami­
f i cations of the new idea . At the very le a st , he needs to 
c onsi der a s  many aspe c t s  of the idea a s  are ne c e s sary t o  
i ndi c a t e  definit e ly whether or not th e idea i s  pra c t i cable . 
The la st sugge st i on for the improveme nt of intui tive 
powe r s  to be made i s  of unque st i onable val idit y ,  as it has 
b e en pract i c e d  so oft en by so many diffe rent people . 
Wh en c onfronted with a problem whi ch defie s so luti on , the 
prob lem- solver shoul d write down all the de tai l s  a s  far a s  
h e  c an go . Then h e  should lay the problem as ide for a whi le 
During the " c ooling" period , while the proble m- s olver is 
engaged in some radi c a l ly different a ctivity , he may get 
c ompl et e , full insight into the problem . 
I n  thi s chapt er , we have n ot only given argument s 
a ga i n st defining the t erm int uit i on ,  but we have al so de­
s c ribe d several c hara c t eri sti c s  of intuition . A lthough 
t he t erm i s  not pre c i se ly defined , thi s paper wi l l  be c on­
s i st ent in the way in whi ch the word is use d .  T hroughout , 
i ntuition shall be used in re lat i on to situat i on s  in whi ch 
fact s are dire c t ly known , without rec ourse t o  logi cal 
r easoning . 
Chapter III 
Intuition and Prob lem-solving 
T o  the mathe matic ian , the fa c et of intuition that i s  
probably most c onspicuous i s  t h e  role played in problem­
s olving . An int e gral part o f  the mat hemat ic ian's activ­
itie s ,  the que st for solutions t o  problems appears t o  be 
a dominant feature of other disciplines a s  we ll . Thus the 
p hysicist , the chemist , the zoo logist , and the ge ographer 
owe at l e a st some of the deve lopme nt s in their fie ld s to 
t he existenc e of proble ms , or rat her , t o  t he fa ct t hat cer­
t ain problems have be en tackled and re solve d .  Pe rhaps it 
i s  not t o o  swe eping a st atement to assert that every t ype 
of progre s s  experie n c e d  by the human race has re sult ed from 
s omeone's awarene s s  of a prob lem . 
Since problems arise c ontinually , not only in fie lds 
o f  study but in every-day situations as well , it behooves 
us to t ake at least a passing glan c e  at a few c onsidered 
o pinions on problem-solving; we can hope therefrom to be 
able to draw one or two re liab le c onc lusion s . Hefore under­
t aking a study of the function of intuit ion in solving prob­
l ems , however , one should unde rstand the spe cial , dire cted 
t ype of thinking ne c essary for getting s olutions. Such 
unde rstanding , in turn , implie s an ac quaint anc e with the 
me chanism of the thinking pro c e s s  plus an over-all view of 
t he ways of thinking commonly e mployed. 
Ac c ordingl y ,  the pre sent discus sion wil l f irst deal 
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with the ways of thinking as categorized by three observers. 
In the first place, Cassius J. Keyser considers all vari­
e ties of thinking as fallin� into three main groups, the 
1 
organic, the empirical, and the postulational. The 
simplest type, the organic, is nothing more than the re­
sponse of a living organism to a stimulus. To illustrate, 
a one-celled animal, the amoeba, as soon as it comes into 
contact with an object, attempts to enclose the object, 
thus forming a food vacuole. Instantly, once contact has 
taken place, the amoeba's cytoplasm streams in such a way 
as to surround the object encountered. Once the fusion 
of the streams of cytoplasm occurs, the object, contained in 
a food vacuole, has become a part of the animal's structure. 
Higher in the scale of thinking is the empirical type, 
which is experimental in nature. A certain degree of lo�ic 
i s  involved, although not to the extent characteristic of 
the most complex type of thinking. An example of the em­
pirical variety is the discovery of the formula for chem­
ical conversion, dx/dt• -kx, in which x represents the 
amount of unconverted substance at any particular time, t. 
Careful experimentation has revealed that the rate at which 
a substance is converted into another is directly proportion­
al to the amount of unconverted substance. The right member 
of the formula is negative, because, as the time increases, 
the amount of unconverted substance decreases. As a general-
1. Cassius J. Keyser, Thinking About Thinking (New 
York, E. P. Dutton and Company, 192 ) , 7 ff. 
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ization based entirely upon past experimentation, t he for­
mula gives a way of predicting the future behavior of sub­
stances, as regards rate of entering into combination with 
others. 
Into the third cate�ory is placed the most complex, 
involved kind of thinking, the postulational. Such thinking, 
which is described by Keyser as deductive, is a method of rea­
soning that is applicable to all fields, not just to mathe­
matics. However, since geometry lends itself so beautifully 
to any discussion concerning deductive reasoning, an illus­
tration will be taken from that field. The high school 
sophomore, when setting out to prove the proposition that 
two points equally distant from the extremities of a line 
d etermine the perpendicular bisector of the line, will prob­
a bly add four auxiliary lines as his first maneuver. After 
proving congruent two of the pairs of triangles so formed, 
h e  ultimately establishes the conclusion of the theorem. 
Of course, the usual form in which the above example 
o f  deductive reasoning would be written would present a 
d ifferent order from that employed in more general situ­
a tions, especially, the non-mathematical. That is, although 
d eduction commonly follows the procedure from general state­
ment to specific statement to conclusion, in the above proof 
t he thinking would proceed from the specific statement to 
t he conclusion and then, to the general statement. Either 
procedure can produce gems of precise, clear, deductive 
thinking. 
Providing an interesting contrast to the groupings 
just described is the system in which four degrees of com-
1 
plexity are recognized. According to this second arrange-
ment, thinking is classified under the heads of perceiving, 
recognizing, comparative judgin�, and reasoning. Listed 
in order of increased complexity, one notes that only the 
very highest type is dignified by the name reasoning. 
A third method of dealing with the kinds of thinking 
consists of grouping all thinking under three classes, 
2 
intuitive, deductive, and inductive. such a grouping is 
distinctive for two reasons. For one thing, intuition is 
given a place among other kinds of thinking. Still more 
i ntriguing, though, is the fact that there is no attempt 
to label one type as simple, another, as complex. The 
source consulted says simply that there are three kinds of 
thinking and proceeds to name them. 
Even a cursory glance at the three foregoing methods 
o f  classification suggests that the three men who composed 
the lists could not have been defining the term thinking 
in the same way. What is more significant in relation to 
the title of this chapter, however, is the inclusion in 
1. R. H. Wheeler, The Science of Psychology, as 
quoted in William Betz' Tlie Teachinf of Intuitive Geometry, 
Eighth Yearbook, NationaI'l!'ouncil o feachers of Mathe­
matics (New York, Bureau of Publications, Teachers Gollege, 
Columbia University, 1933), 146. 
2. Lee Emerson Boyer, Mathematics a Historical Develop­
� (New York, Henry Holt and Company, f945), 303 ff. 
each list of at least one kind of thinking utilized in prob­
lem solving. 
In the course of classifying the ways of thinking, 
one inevitably speculates about the actual mechanism of 
thinking itself. Moreover, the mathematician is especially 
curious about the manner in which direction is given to 
his thinking. He realizes that at worst, his thinking is 
no more than a jumble of disconnected links, whereas, at 
best, it presents a chain of ideas that are neatly hooked 
together. He want s to analyze the situations in which his 
thinking has been orderly and systematized; he hones there-
by to be able to apply the all-important direction to the 
disconnected links, wherever and whenever he meets them. 
When reviewing several cases in which his thinking 
has been truly fruitful, the mathematician discovers that 
1 
consistently he has emphasized the structural aspects. 
That is, in stressing the "wholeness" of the situation, he 
h as envisaged the given facts and sought-for solution as 
comprising� pattern. Success resulted from ferreting 
out the inter-relationships among the given facts and the 
ideas inferred from the given facts. However, this state­
ment does not give the whole truth, for, just as important, 
if not more so, is the discovery of the relation each 
single fact bears to the whole pattern. 
Emphasizing t he whole pattern or structure has at least 
1. Max Wertheimer, Productive Thinking (New York, 
Harper and Brothers, 1945), 190. 
two advantap.;es over traditional logic as an explanation of 
1 
the way thinking occurs. In the first place, since thinking 
takes place in living organisms, any explanation concerning 
the process of thinking must take into account the element 
of change. Traditional logic, however, is static; it does 
not allow for the changes which take place in any problem-
situation during the course of a given discussion. Such 
changes do indeed occur, for, as each additional relation­
ship is understood, the whole picture is seen in a new light. 
Furthermore, the emphasis on lo�ic tacitly implies that 
an idea is simply the sum of its parts, that is, the steps 
leading up to the idea. In both respects, awareness of 
structure appears to be the more nearly accurate explanation 
o f  the mechanism of thinking, since such an explanation 
recognizes inevitable change and also includes the relation-
ships of individual ideas to the whole pattern. Thus, the 
process of thinking appears to be characterized by a search 
for relationships and an appreciation of the structure of 
a given situation, a structure that necessarily changes 
from moment to moment. 
At this point, the mathematician may ponder on the 
causes of the changes in structure experienced as he pro-
ceeds from step to step in \·mrkinp.: out a solution to a prob-
lem. Why, at a particular point, is a particular relation­
ship sug�ested? What initiates his moving in a particular 
direction? In brief, what guides his thinking? Some may 
1. Max Wertheimer, Productive Thinking ( New York, 
Harper and Brothers, 1945), 192. 
an swer that his mind is working in acc ordan ce with the 
pre scribed rule s of logic. Of c ourse, he like s to pic­
ture him self as pro c e e ding logic ally, but the que stion of 
c ause still bothers him . One observer goe s s o  far as to 
c laim that there is almost ne ver a c ompl et e l y. logical dis-
1 
c overy . I nt uition i s  involved, near ly always; at l e a st , 
i ntuition e xplains the guidanc e whi ch directs the fir st 
step t aken in thinking through a logical proof. Others 
would soften this stat eme nt c onside rably by a ssert ing 
merely that intuition may indicat e what st e p  t o  take . 
Inasmuc h  as an analytic proof t o  a theorem oft en Pre­
c ede s a synthetic proof , it would se em that intuition would 
more likely be inst rum ental in det ermining the order of the 
s t e p s  of the analytic pr oof. Thus , tho se '�ho credit intu­
ition with playing a role in the writing of proof s would 
p robably a s c ribe the determination of the st eps of the f o l­
l owing proof to intuit ion. Le st anyone b e  mi sle d , l et us 
make c l e ar th e fact that whe n we refer to the determinat ion 
of st eps , we mean the orde r , not the validit y of the step s .  
The validit y ,  o f  c our se , i s  asc ert aine d  b y  l o gic. 
In proving a theorem analytical ly, the general patt ern 
i s  to pro c e e d  backwards, from the conclusion to the hynoth­
e sis . Henc e , in attacking analytically t he propo sition 
t hat lines drawn from any point on the pe rpendicular bi­
s e c t or of a line t o  the e xtremitie s of the line are equal , 
1. Jacque s Hadamard, The Psyc ho logy of I nvent ion !a 
the Math emat ical Field (Princeton , New Jer se y, Pr!nce t o n  
Universit y  Pr e s s , I945J, 112. 
t he student will start with the conclusion. B efore he can 
go through any st eps , however , he need s to expr e ss the hypoth­
e s i s  in terms of an illustration , which he either picture s 
in his mind or actually draws on paper. A po s sible pro cedure 
follows: 
H ypothe sis: RY is the perpendic ular bisector of AB and 
me e t s  AB at Y; X is any point on RY , distinct from R and Y .  
T o  prove: AX = BX . 
Since c orre sponding part s of c ongruent t riangles are equal , 
AX= BX if 
AAXY � d BXY if 
S .  A. s. obtains if 
AY ::: YB if 
Y is the midpoint of AB if 
Y fulfillA the definit ion of midpoint if 
XY is the pe rpendic ular bisector of AB and meet s 
AB at Y. ( Hypothesis ) 
XY := XY. 
Since all right angles are equal , "XIA : ..::..XYB if 
.4. :X:YA is a right anp;le ; L. .X.YB is a right anE:le if 
XY .J... AB at Y if 
XY is the perpendicular bise ctor of AB and meets 
AB at Y. ( Hypothe sis ) 
With reference t o  the analytic proof outlined above , 
some mathematic ians would doubtle ss asc ribe to int uition 
\ 
the direction assume d by all the steps . The se people cre dit 
t o  intuition not only the first st ep,  but sub sequent steps 
as well. Their arr;ument is that the initial impulse to 
prove a pair of triangle s c ongruent is urged by t he illustra­
tion , which reveals AX and BX to be c orre sponding part s of 
what appear t o  be c ongruent triangle s .  Any re l ationship 
that is sugge sted by a c oncrete figure is an appeal t o  
intuit ion , they c ont end. Furthermore , they insist that the 
steps following the first are likewise sugge st e d  by int uition, 
for example , the step at which Y i s  proved to be the mid­
point of AB or the one at which..:::.XYA i s  shown to b e  a 
right angle. 
A more conservative group , unon viewing the proof , 
would perhaps concede that only the initial direction i s  
known intuitively . Thus this group feel s that intuition 
i s  called into play only at the v e ry beginning , when a 
consideration of the figure suggest s the pos sibilit y of 
congruent triangle s .  Still others w ould point t o  the po s­
sibilit y of a c ombination of exp erience , ana lysis of ul­
timate relation ship sought , and trial-and-error providing 
t he guidance ; the se observers might eliminat e intuition 
from the pic ture entirely. A fourth group is c omposed of 
those who , because of the sket chin e s s  of the evidence 
offered by the other three group s , must remain unde cided.  
They st rongly suspe ct that intuition has played a part in 
t he proof , s o  to spe ak , but c annot overlook t he chance of 
the student's having derived dire ction from other sourc e s , 
such as trial -and-error. 
Re gardl e s s  of how the order of the st e p s  in the above 
proor is explaine d ,  one must bear in mind that there have 
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been experiences in the lives of some famous mathematicians 
that assuredly strengthen the case for intuition. One in­
triguing situation concerns a Frenchman of the seventeenth 
1 
century, Pierre de Fermat. It appears that at the time of 
Fermat's death, someone, while going through the mathe­
matician' s papers, found a mystifying comment scribbled in 
a narrow margin. In that margin Fermat had indicated that 
he had proved the impossibility of the relation, xm + Ym= zl'n, 
when x, y, and z are integers other than zero and m is an 
integer larger than 2. However, he had lamented his not 
having enough space in the margin to write his proof. The 
mystery lies in the fact that in the three hundred years 
since, the proof has not been discovered by anyone, despite 
great efforts. The most that has been accomnlished in these 
three centuries of work is some partial proofs. That is, 
proofs for some classes of values of the exponent, m, have 
been discovered. What is inexplicable is the reliance of 
at least one partial proof on algebraic theories that were 
unknown at the time of Fermat and which were not even implied 
remotely in his writings. 
Equally puzzling is an account concerning a German 
2 
geometer of a century ago, Bernhard Riemann. In his work 
with prime numbers Riemann emphasized a function of a 
1. Jacques Hadamard, The Psycholo�y .2.f. Invention in 
the Mathematical Field ( Princeton, New ersey, Princeton 
lJii!versity Press, 1945), 116 ff. 
2. Ibid., 117 ff. 
variable which could assume both real and imaginary values. 
At his death, there was found among his papers a note which 
stated that certain properties of the function had been 
deduced from an expression of the function which he had 
never simplified enough to publish. As of now, no one has 
the slightest notion of the nature of the expression. 
In both cases, there appears to be some justification 
for the view that these men had intuitive knowledge which 
they either did not, or could not organize to the extent 
of communicating with others. Thus Fermat seems to have 
" sensed" a proof that, to all appearances, hinged upon 
relations not yet discovered. Similarly, Riemann " knew" 
an expression that has eluded other great thinkers down 
to the present. Since apparently neither mathematician 
could have gone through any variety of logical reasoning 
to reach his particular observation, each must have gained 
his knowledge directly, or intuitively. 
Furthermore, intuition can explain the sudden insight 
a problem-solver may experience. In the course of solving 
any problem, there comes the moment when the pattern is 
seen with clarity; this is the moment of instght. Several 
examples of such insight are cited in the next chapter. 
When the problem- solver is unsuccessful, that is, unable 
to obtain the necessary insight, he might try writing down 
all the steps as far as he can go. At each step he might 
ask himself if he is certain of the step and why he feels 
certain. If he comes to a step which makes him feel doubtful, 
he might try to figure out what it is about the step that 
has shaken his confidence. Regardless of how much analyzing 
he does, however, he should get away from his problem for 
a while. Leaving the problem is advantap;eous for two 
reasons. In the fir st place, there is the chance that, 
after the rest, the student may approach his prob lem from 
a n  ent irely new slant. For another reason, while he is en­
gaged in somet hi ng quite different from problem-solving, 
he just _!!!ie;ht have a flash of " intuitive insight" into his 
problem. If so, he wi ll instantly see the whole pattern, 
and thus the solution. Some of the ways of perceiving the 
whole pattern will be viewed in the next chanter. 
Chapter IV 
Intuition and Insight 
As the moment of achi evement in problem- solving c ome s 
the instant that insight o c c urs , it would be we ll t o  examine 
not only the sourc e s  of insi ght , but also the meanino.: of 
t he t erm . Ina smuc h a s  some people may confuse the terms 
insight and intuit ion and may even conside r them synony­
mous , a di scus sion of the relat ionsh ip betwe en the two 
apoe ar s  warrante d .  
Insi ght means d i sc e rnment , c ognit i on ,  awareness of the 
pattern conne cting ideas previ ously thou ght to be unre lat ed . 
Th i s  awarene ss or di s c ernment may re sult from a c areful 
analysi s of the factors involved . Analy si s is not always 
a prere qui site , however , for insi �ht may , and often doe s , 
stem from intuit i on. The relat i onship between insight and 
intuit ion t herefore , can be s e en in thinking of intuit ion 
and analysi s as two sourc e s  of in sight . 
In hope s of ga ining ins ight by analysi s ,  t he problem­
s ol ver should c ont inually st rive t o  see the problem as a 
wh ole . l He should keep viewing t he problem from " above" 
in order to s e e  it as a unit . 
A mathemat i c al illustrat i on of ins ight stemming from 
ana ly sis i s  drawn from the fi eld of diffe re nt i al equat ions . 
A student i s  a sked to solve the different i al e quat ion , 
,,. p + xp - J y  = 0 ,  in whi c h y i s  the de pendent vari ab le , 
1. Howard F .  Fehr , "Th e  Role of In sight in the Learning 
of Mathemati c s" , The Math emat i c s  Teacher ( Oct ober , 1954) , 
XLVI I , 388 .  ----
3 0 .  
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x is the indepe� dent variable, and p represents the rate of 
c ha nge of y with respect to x .  First of all, the student 
must be clear a s  to the nature of his goal. Req uired to find 
the solution t o  a differential equation, he must know what 
the word solution means when used in that p articular way. 
At the outset then, before embarking on any ste ns, he vis­
ualizes his goal as a re lationship involving at least o ne of 
the v ariables, which, together with its derivatives, sat­
isfies the given equation. In orde r that the general 
s olution in parametric form may be found, each variable 
must be expressed in terms of p .  T o  express y i n  terms of 
p ,  it is ne ce ssary to eliminate x .  The variable x can be 
eliminated by getting x alone in the left member and then 
differentiating with res pe ct to y .  (Of course, to eliminate 
y in a comparable manne r would be just as logical a be­
g inning. ) 
( 1 ) Accordingly, since p � + xp - Jy = 0 
3 Y  .s 
( 2 )  x =  p - p 
_J_ 3 3't .a. d p  
< 3 )  r � r - <r + J p >fr 
The act o f  simplifying, collecting like terms, and 
multiplyinp; throughout by l/2 p  dy reveals a linear equation 
of the firs t  order. 
( 4) � � '3 dy - .1. y p :::: � 
3 
p dp 
Equation ( 4 ) is advantageous, for such an equation can be 
changed 
grating 
( 5 )  
easily into an exa ct e quation by applying an 
-i 
factor, which, in ·this case, is p � .  T hus , 
::.!. .a. �:- L ..L 
p .z. dy - :z, y p 2. dp ::::. .2,... p 2' dp 
3 �--: c 
( 6) I nt e grating , y p -:'..r .:: 1:- p 21 + 7 
inte-
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The c onst ant of int e gration is written as c/5 b e c ause the 
pre senc e of the 3/ 5 demands a mult iplic ation by 5 in order 
that the e quation may be c leared of fracti ons . Writin � 
t he arb itrary conatant, term originally a s  c/ 5 will yie ld 
c for the c on stant after the multiplication by 5 has been 
c arried out . Spe cifically, the next st ep i s  to mult i �ly 
t hroughout by 5p-i;, yi elding 
( 7 ) 5y = 3P¥ + c p
l: 
I n  order to expre s s  x in t erms of the paramet er p ,  the 
value for y obt ainable from e quat ion ( 7 ) i s  substitute d  
f or y in 
{ 8 } 
( 9) 
{ 10) 
equation (2) . Thus , 
x = 3P 
_, ..L "' c 
(.r  f' .... 7 
Simplifying , _!/:_ x :::. $" 
p
-i) 
3 
- p 
3 3C.. p
± 
p +s:-
C le aring of fra ctions , 
3 
5x .::: 4P + 
..L 
3cp � 
The general solutio n consi st s of e q uat i ons l 7 )  and ( 10) . 
I n  attac king the abo ve problem , the prob lem- solver' s 
reali zat ion of the nature of the go al determined his first 
significant move , differentiating with re spe c t  t o  y .  N e xt ,  
the c orre ct c la s sification of e quation ( 4 ) wa s imperative 
t hat dire ction for the next st e p  be gained . The t hird 
important point c onsi �t e d  of the sub st itution perf ormed in 
order t o  ac quire equation ( 8 ) . 
At all t hre e sta�e s , insight was gained be cause of 
an ordering and c lassifying of the eleme nt s· .  At the fir st 
a nd third st age s ,  d irection was obtained by analyzinf! t he 
t ype of relationship s ought , an expre ssion for each var­
iable in t e rms of p and o ne arbitrary c onstant . At the 
3 3 . 
s e c ond st av,e , an anal ysi s of the mak e -up of e quati on ( 4 )  
l e d  t o  the awaren e s s  of linearity and hen c e  t o  the solut i on 
o f  that part i c ualr e quat i on .  
I n  sharp c ontrast t o  the manner in whi ch insight was 
gained in t he pre ceding i l lustrat i on i s  an int e re st i n �  c a s e  
c on c e rning the German c hemi st , Friedr i ch A .  Kekul� . 1 A s  
profe s sor o f  or �ani c c h emi stry at Ghent Univers i t y  i n  B e l-
/ gium , Ke kule had , for some t ime , been attempt ing t o  fat hom 
t he molecular arrangement of benzene , wh i c h  arrangement 
appeared to e lude him. One night in 186 5 ,  he had a dre am 
s o  vivid that as soon as he awoke , he dashed t o  hi s de sk 
for paper and penc i l . Exc itedly he drew the p i c ture so 
c lear in hi s mind . The patterD t hat had occurred to him 
whi le a sle ep was the arrangement of at oms in a molecule .or;· 
of benzene . The n ext morning he enthusiast i c a lly showed the 
d rawing to h i s  c ol l eague s ,  who , under standab ly enouf;h , were 
not nearly so convinced of the ac curac y  of the diaf;ram as 
wa s Kekul� . Through the month s ,  however , a s  experiment s 
d e aling with the behavi or of benzene tended t o  support 
Kekule ' s  arrangement , the c o-worke rs be c ame proponent s 
of h i s  views . 
1 .  Lawrence Galton , " Th e  Professor H ad a Dream" , 
!at i on ' s Busine s s  ( June , 1948 ) , X XXVI, 67& 
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About' e i ghty years aft er the sensat ional dream and 
about fift y  years aft er the c hemi st ' s death , ab solute 
verifi c at i on was a c c ompli shed in the laborat ori e s  of 
Eastman Kodak C ompany .  T h e re , mole cule s of benz ene wer e  
photographe d ,  t he phot osraphs bearing out , in the mo st 
minut e detai l ,  the arrangement known intuit ively to K e kul' 
years before l 
Not so dramati c , but equally a s  thril lin� i s  the ex­
p erienc e of a student a y e ar ago . H e re is the prob l em which 
h ad te ased him f or two days . Let P and Q be c ont inuous 
fun c t i ons of x and y and have cont i nuous derivat ive s , wit h  
;ip/"ii>y�'f!>Q/ax., e xc e pt a t  t he point s ( 4 , 0 } ,  ( O , O) , and ( - 4, 0 ) . 
!l a. 
Le t c ,  denot e the c ircle : ( x - 2) + y = 9 ;  let C �  denote 
.i ;a. 
t he c ircle : ( x + 2) + y = 9 ;  let C s. denote the c i rc l e : 
x a. +  y
�
::: 2 5 .  Given t hat[P d:x: + Q dy =- 11 , f P dx + Q dy 
1 G.;a, 
.:::: 9 ,  [ P dx. + Q dy .:; 13 , find i P dx + Q dy , where C+ i s  
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.2 .2.. 'I t he c i r c le : x + y = 1 .  Upon maki ng a drawing , the stu-
dent r e alized t hat C3 c ontained the thr e e  c i rc l e s  enc l o s i ng  
t he point s of di s c ont i nuit y .  He knew f rom a previ ously 
solved problem , that under the c ondit i o ns in the pre sent 
problem , the line int egral around C3 wa s  e qual t o  the sum 
of t he line i nt e grals around the c i r c le s  surroundin� the 
p o i nt s  of di s c ont i nuit y ,  Erovide d ,  t hat each c ircle about 
such a point enc lo s e d  none of the other tr ouble s ome point s . 
Herein lay the c rux of the whole puz z ling matt e r .  U n­
f ortunat e ly ,  t he c i rc l e s  c, and C .a, overlappe d ,  with c..,. 
b e ing internally tangent t o  e ac h  of the other t wo c i rc ld s .  
3 5. 
Perhaps we should not use the word unfortunat ely sinc e , 
i f  the thre e circ le s had not overlapped , the exerc i se 
would have been trivial , and hen c e  would not have posed a 
problem at all . 
T o  return to the student , several time s he examined 
t he drawi ng ,  hoping to see some l e ,ga l vvay of t1 movin g" the 
cir c l e s  so as to have no overlappi ng . He referred a gain 
and again to the hypothe se s ,  as a c h e c k  on the ac curacy of 
h i s  d i agram . Howeve r ,  h i s  c i r c l e s  b ore the very re lat ion-
shi p s  to each other that had b een st i pulat e d  by the hy­
pothe se s . At la st , admitting that hi s tac t i c s  were �etting 
h im nowhere , he laid the problem as i de and went about other 
dut i e s . that were c rying f or hi s att ent i on . A few hours 
l ater , wh i le oc cupied with a mundan e t ask , he had a flash 
of intui t ive insight int o the pr ob lem. All at onc e , whi le 
he wa s t hinking ab out something: utt erly different , the 
" fl a sh" came ; ri ght away , without going through any var­
i et y  of " if-then" re asoning , he � how t o  c ombat the over-
l apping c irc le s .  I n  thi s moment of insight , he saw that 
[f{ P C.a. dx + Q dy ) - f ( P dx + Q dy)J would indeed give a � 
l ine int e gral ab out a c ircle surr ounding the point ( - 4 , 0 ) , 
a c i rcle that would not overlap the others . S imult aneously 
he saw that he c oul d deal i n  a s imi lar fashion with the po int 
( 4 , 0 ) . All of thi s he gra sped in an i n st ant , in much l e s s  
t ime than i s  be ing re quired t o  re c ord hi s experie nce . 
The .insight re ali z e d  above was of the " intuit ive fla sh" 
t ype and was not t he out c ome of c areful analysi s and 
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r e a soning , such as charact erized the solut ion of the dif­
f erential e quat ion. Like Ke kul, , the student obtained 
insight into his problem whe n he was detached from the 
p roblem , both phys i c ally and mentally . 
In all three probl em s de scribed , the differential 
e quation , the molec ular arrangement of ben z ene and t he 
p roblem dealin� with line int e grals , in si �ht wa s the im­
mediate fore-runner of solution . I n  the la st two in stanc e s ,  
penetrat ing in sight c ame all at on c e , on an oc c a sion hard­
ly thou ght conducive to problem- solving. I n sight into 
s olving the differential e quation , however , fol lowed care ­
ful analysis and consciou s applic ation of re asonin g to the 
problem. No claim is be i n g  made that intuition played no 
p art at all in solving the fir st problem ; rather , the dis­
t inction betwe e n  the t wo met hod s of solution lie s in the 
faet that on the one hand , insight was �ained erir:i arily 
by deliberat e analysi s , whereas on the othe r hand , insight 
occurred as an unexpe c t e d  f lash of underst andin g. 
Of course , fla she s of in sight are not confined to mat h­
ematics and laboratory experienc e s .  Su ch in sight fre quent ly 
guide s  ac tions in every-day sit uat ions a s  we ll. For in­
stanc e ,  upon bein � introduc ed to a stranger , a per son may 
" know" instant ly that he has ju st found a friend . A lthough 
he may not wit h a c c ura cy be able to attribute his knowledge 
t o  sudden insi�ht into the othe r's c hara c t e r , he neverthe­
l e ss sen s e s  something in the other that is in harmony with 
h i s  own int e re st s. 
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Then t oo , on the very fi rst day of scho o l , a t eacher 
may need to select a pup il to run an e rrand . P r e suppo sing 
a lac k  of a c q uaintanc e 'With her student s , the t eac her must 
r e ly on the k ind of judgment t hat i s  not b a sed on r e asoni ng. 
She loo k s  the c lass over ; qui ckly she choos e s  a c hi ld she 
t hi n k s  i s  dependable . Somet ime s she err s in making such 
" s pot" est imate s ,  but very oft en sub seque nt de alings with 
her pupils bear out her init ial impress i o n s . 
Also , a j udge wi ll some t ime s su spend sent enc e for no 
other reason than a hunc h  about the character of the a c cused ; 
for no i dentifiabl e re ason , he i s  c onfident that the other 
will not abuse the c hanc e to mak e  a new start . 
Sp eaking of c ase s involvi ng th e law , several crimes 
h ave b een so lve d be cause of some officer ' s intuit ive in­
s i ght . That i s ,  the offi c e r  knows th e instant he se es a 
part i cular su spect that he has found the �ui lty one . B e ­
c ause of his a s suran c e  o f  the suspect ' s gui lt , he real i ze s  
t hat obta ining a c onf e s si on i s  s imply a matter o f  time . 
Of course , we are not ref erring to the t ype of situat i on in 
whi c h  there are t ell-t ale nervous mannerisms or strong c ir­
cumst ant ial evidenc e .  Ve mean the kind of c a s e  in whi c h  
guilt i s  imme diately known , even when t h ere i s  not enough 
evi denc e to warrant strong susni c i on .  
O n  less serious occ asi ons , a per son somet imes wi l l  have 
r e al insight into the r e liability or lac k of re liabi lity of 
another , but for some inexpli c able re a son , does not abide 
by h i s  hunch . For example , a teacher i s  approached by a 
p up i l  i n  regard to a loan . P e rhaps t here i s  somethin� not 
qui t e  c onvinc ing in the story t h e  �upil pours out ; perhaps 
there is some t hing i n  the pup i l ' s  manner that doe s  not ring 
t rue . Very po ss ibly the t e ac he r , if he wi l l  be frank with 
h imsel f , i s  aware from the beginning of the int e rv i ew of the 
l a c k  of wisdom of lending the pupi l money . Fooli shly , the 
t e a c h e r  reaches for h i s  chec k-b o o k  and write s the uun i l  a 
c h e c k  for t he amount deemed ne c e s sary . True , the terms of 
r e - payment are di scus sed ; nevert he less , the t eacher i s  re­
gret ting hi s act ion as soon as the pupi l has left . Months 
l at e r ,  when he i s  forced to admit that he wi l l  never be able 
t o  exact re- payme nt , he castip:at e s  himself for having c losed 
h i s  eye s  to hi s f ir st insight , unhappily c orre ct . 
Hence , i n s i ght stemming from intui t i on c an be exper­
i en c ed in widely differing si tuat i on s , from the arrangement 
of a molecule of benz ene , to a problem in advanc ed calculus , 
t o  an ac knowl edgment of an introduc ti on , t o  a c ourt of law . 
Concerned primar i ly with the c ru c i al moment in Prob­
l em- solv i ng , the poi nt at whi c h  insi ght occurs , thi s chap­
t er has pre sent e d  ins ight as a r e c ognit ion of the patt e rn 
c onn e cting the e lement s of a prob lem-situat i o n .  Further­
more , in order to se e what re lation in si1�ht b ears to intu­
i t i on ,  two sour c e s  of in s i ght were exami ned and i llust rat e d  
i n  some det ai l .  Thu s ,  t h e  so lut ion of t h e  different ial 
e quat ion feat ure d analysi s as a pre liminary to insight ,  
whereas , in the so lut ions to the problems dealing with the 
mole cular arrangement of benz ene and the line inte.o:ral s ,  as 
well as in t he less det ai led example s ,  intuit ion playe d a 
dominant role . 
C hapt er V 
Intuit ion and Ge ometry 
Now that a study of the r e lat i onshi p between intu it i on 
and insight h a s  been pre s ented , the next re lat i onship t o  
be regarded i s  that of intuit i on to the c ourse s o  long 
r evered in hi gh school c urri cula , geometry . The sub j e ct 
of intuit ive ge ometry i s  v i gorously debate d ,  with one fac ­
t i on assert i ng that intui t i on i s  indi spensable to the study 
of ge ometry and anot her fact ion de c lari n �  with e q ual sin­
c erit y t hat intuition ha s no be aring whatever on t h e  t opi c 
of ge ometry . Thu s ,  with whi chever fact ion the student a l i gn s  
h imse lf , h e  must b e  prepare d ' t o  defend h i s  po sit ion a�ain st 
f ormi dable , thought - provoking att a c k s  from the other groun . 
Since the sub j e c t  of intuit ive geometry i s  far from shallow , 
i t  c annot b e  d i s p ensed wit h  in a summary fash i on .  The most 
we can hope to do i s  to pre sent the t e l l inp; argument s bot h  
for and again st the intuit ive approach t o  t h e  study o f  ge ­
ometry. We be li eve there i s  more evi den c e  in favor of the 
one s ide , rather t han , the other . However , we cannot forget 
t hat the re are d i s senter s who s e  opini ons c annot be sl i �ht e d , 
who are equally c o nvi n c e d  of the rea sonablene s s  of their 
stan d . 
Before pro c e edi ng further , t he meaning of the nhra se 
intuitive ge ometry should be c lari f i e d .  I ntuitive ge ometry , 
o ft en called i nformal , concret e , heuri st i c ,  and experimental , 
i s  t hat approach to geomet ry whi c h  i s  c haract eri zed b y  drawi n� 
generali z at i ons from c ommon exner i e nc e s .  I n  the traditi onal 
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demonstrat ive t ype , on t h e  other hand , the subj e ct -matter 
i s  o r,e'ani zed int o  a formal body of proofs . In thi s lat t er 
var i e t y  of ge ometry , each new fact i s  beli eved true by vir­
t ue of it s . being l o gi c ally derive d from st at ement s previ ously 
a c c e pt e d .  In such geometry , the truth of a part i cular st ate ­
ment may or may not be immediat e ly apparent . 
An ardent defender of tradi t i onal methods and vig­
o rous o pponent to the use of int uiti on as a basi s for 
studying any phase of ge ometry i s  an Aust r i an mathemati ci an ,  
Hans Hahn . 1  Insi st ing upon a purely logi cal basis for the 
c on struct ion of m athemat ic s ,  he points to the unreliabi lity 
o f  i ntuit ion a s  evidence favoring his assert i o n .  T hus , in 
support of hi s po sit ion , he menti ons spe c if i c al ly two not ­
able fact s oppo sed t o  what would probably b e  c onsidered 
" intuit ively obvious" . For one thing , H ahn brings out the 
f act that there are curves that p o s se ss .!!2 t angent at any 
p oint . Anot her i dea e qually unpalatable i s  bis. c laim t hat 
t here exi st wave curve s whi ch cannot be gen erat ed by the 
mot i on of a point . Hahn says t hat offhand , anyone , when 
r eferring t.o experienc e , would think the oppo sit e of either 
of t h e s e  statement s to be the c a s e . B y  making use of c on­
vinc ing i llustrat i ons , though , he b acks up both stat ement s 
i n  a manner t hat c annot be i gnored . What thi s mathemat i c i an  
l .  
Ameri c an 
Hans Hahn , " G e ometry and I ntuition" , S c i ent ific 
( Apri l ,  1954} , C XC ,  84 ff. 
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has shown , i n  a dramat i c  manner , i s  that int uit i on c annot 
b e  depended upon to gui de accurately . 
Hahn' s chi ef argume nt against the use of intui t ion in 
geometry , however , is the poi nt de alt with at some length 
i n  a previous chapt e r .  R eference i s  being made t o  the fact 
t hat the word intuit i on i s  def ined different ly by different 
people . A c c ording to H ahn , the lack of definition implie s 
the impo ssibi l ity of ascribing any part i c ular geometric truths 
to intuit ion , whi ch , i n  turn , impli e s  the utter uselessness 
of intuit ion as a basi s for geometry . 
At the other extreme , another mathematic i an , William 
Betz , gee s  so far as to assert that intuition plays an in-
d i spensable part in demonst rative geometry. l With gre at 
f ervor he out line s several significant supporting fact s ,  
of which a few will be pre sent e d  here . In the first plac e , 
he maint ains that intuition cannot b e  overlooked , for sooner 
o r  later , eve ry re lati on must be explained by meaningful t erma . 
Apparently , Betz thinks t hat , for a t erm t o  be meaningful , it 
must be related to experienc e , to ordinary ob servation. 
Also , any use of ge ometric fi gure s is an appeal t o  
i nt uition . Not only are phy s i c al prope rt i e s of figure s 
1 .  Wi lliam B et z , T he Te aching of I ntuitive Geomet ry ,  
Eighth Yearbook of t h e  National u ounCil ot Te achers of 
Mathemati c s  ( N ew York , B ureau of Publicat i ons , T e achers 
College , C olumbia Univer sity ,  1933 ) ,  55 ff . 
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known by intui t i on ,  but po s iti ona l fact s as wel l .  For 
instan c e , int e rsect ing l i ne s , int er s e ct i n g  c i r c l e s ,  con­
c e nt ri c circle s , and ad j a cent an gles are so underst ood . 
Mo st s ignifi c ant , though , i s  the functi on of intu­
i t i on in the so- c al l e d  " logi cal" a s pe ct s  of geometry. A s  
i ndi c at e d  earlier ,  t h e  vali dit y o f  a parti cular st e p  i n  a 
proof i s  des ignat ed by logi c , but whi c h  step t o  take next 
i s  oft en sugge st e d  b y  intuit i on .  Thus , even i n  the c on­
struc t i on of a synthet ic proof , some cre dit should go to 
i n tuit i on , for , previous to bein g bui lt up synthet i cally , 
t he proof probably was t hought through ana l yt i cally. During 
the analyti c  stage s ,  intuiti on may have been inst rument al in 
determining the order of the st e p s . 
Further evi den c e  favoring intui tion i n  geometry i s  
f ound i n  hi st or y .  Only a novi c e  naive ly credi t s  all the 
relat i onshi p s  in Eu c l i dean ge ometry to Euc li d himself . 
Euc lid' s  genius lay not in d i s c overy , but rather in the 
ability to organize eff e c t ively re lat ionsh i os alr eady known 
by intuit i on .  That the se re lati on sh i p s  �ras ped intuit ively 
by the people of pre -Euc li dean time s we re not proved , d i d  
not l e s s en t h e  assurance with whi c h  t h e y  were appl i e d  in 
pract i cal s ituat i ons . Henc e , before the r i s e  of demon­
strat ive ge ometry , mathemat i c al re lat i onship s ,  lacking both 
proof and organ i z at i on , were neverth e le s s  kn own to be true ; 
such knowledge i s  being a s c ribed to intui t i on .  
Supporte d  by st aggering evi dence gathered from the 
n e c e s s i t y  for meaningful terms , from the universal use of 
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geometr i c fi gures ,  from the manner i n  whi c h  posit ional facts 
are a s c ertaine d , from t he indi s pensab l e  role p laye d in the 
deve lopment of an analyt i c  proof , and from hi story , the case 
f2!: intuit ion a s  a basi s for geometry i s  a strong one . The 
que st i on now ari se s  a s  t o  the methods appropr i at e  for pre ­
_senting a course i n  intuit ive geometry . 
Before embarking on any kind of answer t o  t hat que st i on , 
perhaps we had better ma ke sure that no one has been mi sled 
i n  the previ ous d i s cussi o n .  ln the r eferenc e s  to two types 
o f  ge ometry , intuit ive and demonstrative , we di d not int end 
t o  give the impre ssion that we are thinking of the se two 
approache s a s  pol e s  apart . That i s , we have not meant to 
imply that a c our se in demonstrat ive geometry can make no 
u se of i ntui t i on , or v i c e  versa . The di st i nction i s  be­
twe en emphase s rather t han between methods thought mutually 
exc lusive . That the two emphas e s  may work hand - in-hand will 
n ow be demonstrated . 
F i rst of all , i n  t eaching beginn ers in demonstrative 
geometry , the t eacher should make po stulate s of all fact s 
that c an be known i ntuit ively. l A li st of such fact s 
follows : 
1. Vert i cal angles are equal 
2 .  I f  two strai ght lines are cut by a tran sversal so 
1 .  Gertrude E .  Allen , An Experiment .!.!! Redi stribut ion 
of Mat erial f or H�gh S c hool GeometrS , Fifth Yearbook of the lational c ounc i l-or-T eachers of Mat emati c s  ( New York , Bureau 
o f  Pub l icat i ons , Te acher s C ollege , C olumbia Univer sity , 1930 ) 
7 9ff . 
t hat t he c orre sp onding angles are equal , the line s are 
p arallel , and t he convers e .  
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3. I f  two straight l ine s are cut by a t ransversal 
s o  t h at the alternate interi or angle s are e q ua l , the line s 
a re parallel , and the conver s e . 
4 .  The are a of a rectangle i s  equa l  t o  the product 
of t h e  length and the wi dth . 
5 .  A c ent ral angle has the s ame numbe r  of de gre e s  a s  
i t s  inter c e pted ar c .  
6 .  Equal cent ra l  angles have equa l arc s ,  and the c on­
ver se . 
7 .  If , whi le approa ching the i r  resD ect ive l imit s ,  
two vari able s are ab-Jays e qual , then t '1 e i r  limi t s  are e qual . 
S .  The base angl e s  of an i so scele s tri angle are e aual , 
and other pro pert i e s  of f i�ures whi ch are evident from 
s ymmet ry should be post ulat ed . 
9. Two triangle s that have thr e e  pai r s  of c orre s­
ponding s i des equal are c o ngruent , and other c a s e s  i n  whi ch 
c ongruen c e  c an be determined by sunerposit i on should be 
p o stulat e d .  
Sinc e a student c an know any of the ab ove fa c t s  intu­
i t ively , he need not go through nroof s ; after all , onc e he 
s e e s the relati on shi n s  indi c Rt e d  above , he is a s  sure a s  
h e  wi ll ever b e  of their ac c e ptabilit y .  Any proof h e  mi ght 
t hink through would not add a whit to hi s surene s s . 
Just as import ant a s  po stulat ing st rtt eme nt s intuitively 
a c c ept able i s  the nec e s s i t y  for giving· empha s i s  to P:eometry 
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i n  the elementary grade s .  I t  i s  a lament able fact t hat 
some schoo l s , possibly mo st , stre s s  �e ometry too lit t le 
i n  the upper �rade s .  Geometry , l ike fore i �n language , has 
suffered from b eing relegat e d  exclusively to h i gh s chool 
leve l ,  at least as re gards most a spe ct s of the sub j e ct . 
Such short - si ghtedne s s  in c urri culum-planni n g  has re sult ed 
i n  t he student ' s  c onfusion , and henc e , fe ar . All at onc e , 
when enro lled i n  tenth-grade geometry , the student finds 
himself sub j e cted t o  a method of pre sentat i on different 
from that employed in any of bis other sub j e ct s . Then too , 
the sub j e c t -matter of ge ometry clings t o gether in a fashi on 
new t o  him and utterly unlike anything previously enc oun­
t e re d .  Furt hermor e , he must learn a whol e  new vo c abulary. 
Reflec t  for a l ittle on the barri er to c ommuni c at i on t hat 
i s  raised by such t erms as Earallel , t ransve rsal , t he orem , 
po stulate , axi om , converse , c ontraPositiye , and nerDen­
diculat .  Even the spe lling of some o f  the t erms pre sent s 
hazards , a s  witne s s  t he word parallel . I t  would be int e r­
e st ing t o  c ompi le a li st of the vari ety of att emnt s at 
spelling thi s one word t hat may app e ar in only one set of 
f inal exami nat i ons t 
Thus , to t he student who ha s had no preparat ion for the 
study of geometry , the subj e ct must s e em t o  be a hod�e-pod�e 
of fact s ,  f i �ur e s ,  and unfami l i ar t erms , whi ch must somehow 
b e  line d up into pre c i se , formal proof s . 
To help their pupi l s  avoid the confus i on re sult i n �  
from the attempt to a s s imi lat e t oo many new ideas t oo 
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qui ckly , teachers can present some of t he t erms and re lat ion­
shi p s  e A_rlier in the pup i l s '  school- life . Small beginnings 
c an even be made i n  the fourth and fifth grade s .  An in­
t e re st i ng si delight i s  the fact that there actually exi st 
t extbooks in geomet ry that were writ t en for the u se of 
c hi ldren as young as five ye ar s of age . 1 
It s e ems that , at the very least , the children of the 
int e rmediate grade s c ould be taught to i dent ify t he more 
c ommon geometri c figur e s , such as the square , the circle , 
and the tri angle . A s  a spe c i al ple a ,  let the j uni or high 
scho o l  pupil under s t and the true re lat i onship between re c ­
t ang l e s  and square s ,  s o  that he wi ll � think of those t wo 
figure s as mem be r s  of two d i st i nct classe s .  I n  our own ex-
perienc e , we do not r e c all a single case of a pupi l embark-
ing upon tenth-grade ge ometry with the reali z at i on that a 
square i s  a spe c ial t ype of re ctangle . 
Whi le introduc ing the young pupi l to G e omet r i c  figure s ,  
l et u s  not limi t ourse lve s t o  �he plane f i gure s .  Aft er all , 
the c h i ld live s i n  a three-dimensi onal world . H e  i s  fami liar 
wit h  boxe s ,  t in c an s , lamp shade s ,  and i c e cream c one s , to 
name just a few of the solids that are an int e gral p.9.rt of 
hi s l ife . Therefor e , it i s  logi cal that he be t au �ht t o  
diffe rent iat e among , for example , re ctan gu lar solids , 
1 .  Wi lliam B et z , The Te achi n,g of I nt uit ive Geomet ry , 
E i ght h Yearbook of the Nati onal � ounCil of Teachers of 
Mathemat i c s  { New York , Burea of P ub l i cat i o n s , T e a c hers 
College , Co lumbia University , 193 3 ) ,  63 . 
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cylinders , c o ne s ,  and frustums of c one s .  With ski llful 
t e ach ing , he c an be l e d  to ob s e rve the i dent i fying proper­
t i e s ,  both tho s e  that separat e the solids and those that 
group variou s  one s t o gether . 
I n  additi on t o  obse rving the properti e s ,  the student 
shou ld be required to art iculate h i s  ob servat i. ons , as such 
a requ irement wi ll train him in pre c i se st at ement and cl ear 
expre ssion . H e nc e , hand-in -hand with observi n g  relat i on­
ships among c on crete figure s ,  the student should b e  ob l i .P-ed 
t o  expre s s  hi s ob servat i on s  verbally , n ot onl y  in orde r t o  
c ontribute to the c la s swork , but e s pec ially to c l arify hi s 
own thinking . Oft en tenth-grade student s capable of making 
keen observat i o ns have be en hampered by the inabi lit y to 
expr e s s  themse lve s .  Thu s , t raining a pup i l  t o  art i culat e 
his thought s wi ll equi p him with just a s  valuable an a s set 
a s  wi l l  te achi ng him to obs erve relat i onshi ps . B oth the se 
a s set s wi ll serve him in good st ead when he is launched upon 
demonstrative geometry . 
Furthe rmore , the jun i or high school student i s  not too 
young , in our opinion , t o  comprehend the relat ivity of truth . 
H e  c an surely be l e d  to see t hat somethi ng i s  t rue only t o  
t he extent that something e l se i s  true , wh i ch , i n  turn , i s  
t rue only t o  t he extent that a third st at ement i s  acc ept­
able . Su ch an understand ing wi ll give him the enormous ad­
vant age of re alizing that , in any kind of reasoning , a set 
of basic as sumpt ions is the st art ing plac e .  We say advantage , 
b e c ause , awa r e  of the � for a s sumpt i on s , he wi l l  not be 
s urpri sed that h i s  cour s e  i n  demon strative geometry f i r st 
l i sts a ssumpti ons , whi ch he wi ll �xpect t o .!:!..§!! in sunport 
of lat e r  stat ement s .  
In the j un i or high grade s ,  the mai n goal , i n  r e�ard 
t o  t h e  part s d e al ing with geometry , shoul d  be to ac quaint 
t h e  pup i l s  e xperiment ally wit h  geometri c fac t s .  Such ex­
perimentat i on involve s intui t i on ,  for f ac t s  c omprehende d  
imme diat e ly t hrough the s e n s e s  wi l l  be ac c ept e d ,  wi thout 
t he f ormali z at ion of proof . 
Not only t he junior high school pupi l s , but the t ent h­
grade student s as well , c an benefit from intuit ive exper­
ime ntati on . It i s  sugge sted that , a s  mu c h  a s  pos sib l e , 
t he student s i n  high s c h o o l  geometry be a llowed t o  u s e  the 
int ui ti ve approa c h , 11hi c h  ut i li z e s  c onstant ly t h e  student s '  
experi e n c e s  and c ommon- sense understandings . I t  i s  r e ­
c ommended that there b e  no aprupt jump , but rat her , a grad­
ual tran sit ion , from t h e  intuitive t o  the demon strat ive . 
If we ll-or.!!ani z ed an d  we ll -taught , t h e  c ourse in ee ometry 
c an suc c e s sfully c ombi ne knowledge gaine d without r e c our se 
to f ormal rea soni n g  with knowl e dge derived from ideas pr e ­
v i ously a c c e pt e d .  
A l s o , b y  makin� fre o uent u se of the analyt i c  method 
o f  pro of and of generali z at i on s  that c an be drawn from 
inspe c t i on of conc rete members of a c l a s s  of f i gure s ,  the 
t ea c he r  will c al l  intuition into p lay . B e st of all , in 
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u sing the anal yt i c  method of pro of , the c la s s  1,vi ll be able 
to se e how the synthet ic proof i s  built up . 
Looking bac k ,  thi s c hapt er first pre s ent e d  the " pr o s" 
and " c on s" of intuit ive geomet ry. I n  vi ew of t he heavy 
evi denc e  favoring suc h cour se -work , it appeared worthwh i l e  
t o  n o t e  some o f  the theor ems that c ould very we ll be p o s ­
tulat ed and why they c ould be po stulat ed . T h e  latter part 
of the chapt er dealt with SUP:ge stion s  for inc luding intu­
i t ive geometry in junior h i gh school ari thme t i c  and the 
a dvantage s ga ined thereby . A l so , refer enc e was made t o  the 
po s s ible combining of the intuit ive and demon strat ive phase s 
of a tenth-grade c ourse in geometry . 
Chapter VI 
Intuition and Mathematical Foundation s 
In the course of con si dering intuition a s  a basis for 
certain phases of geometry , one may naturally wonder about 
the role of intuition in the very foundations of math­
ematics. Although no clear-cut statement is pos sible, the 
positions of two of the leading schools of thou�ht will 
be portrayed in hopes of shedding some much-needed light . 
We are referring, of course, to the intuitionist and form­
a list schools of mathematical foundations. FollowinP,: 
a cursory examination of the views of the schoo l s  deemed 
by the writer to be the most significant, implications of 
oppo sing attitudes towards the Law of the Excluded Middle 
will be explored. 
Probably the predominant characteristic of the for­
malist school, of which David Hilbert was the leadin� ex­
ponent, is the thought that the foundations of mathemati c s  
d o  not lie in logic, but rather, in prelogical symbols 
that are the bas e s  for logical thinkinp; and a.re under-
1 
stood intuitively. These prelogical symbo l s, the for-
ma.lists argue , should be manipulated mechanically according 
t o  arbitrary rules, so that the whole body of mathematic s 
2 
becomes formalized into a collection of formulae . 
1. E .  R .  Stabler, Introduction to Mathemat ical Thou�ht 
( Cambridge, Ma s sachus etts, Addi son-WeS'Ie y Publi shing Company, 
Incorporated, 1 9 53 ) ,  2 50. 
2 .  Louis O .  Kattsoff, A Philosophy of Mathematics 
( Ames , Iowa, The Iowa State Colle�e Pres s-;-1949 ) , 122 . 
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rurthermore ,  the arbitrary rule s followed in manipulati nR 
t he symbol s  are re stric t e d  only t o  the c ondition that they 
1 
display c onsi st ency. Such c onsi stency, the formal i st s  claim, 
i s  suffi c ient t o  guarant e e  exi stence of any parti cular num-
2 
ber . !''or inst an c e , it mi ght be assumed t hat there i s  no 
s uch number a s  one with a spe c i al given property. Suppos e , 
however, that reasoning base d on a set of po stulate s al­
r eady ac c epte d  leads to a c ontradi ction of the as sumpti on 
with regard t o  the number .  Thi s c ont rad i c tion i s  enough , 
t he formalist s argue , to g;ive assurance of the actual 
e xi sten c e  of t he number . In other word s , the contradiction 
of the assumption that t here i s  no such numbe r  me ans that -
there ,!.!! such a number . �ore generally, a statement i s  
consi dere d  t o  be true i f  i t  c an be shown t o  lead t o  no 
3 
c ontradi cti on . 
On the other si de of the fenc e ,  the intuitionist s  as sert 
t hat consi ste n c y  does not imply exi stenc e l of a number ) but 
4 
r at her , mere ly the po ssibi lity of exi stenc e .  1'hus , if 
t he assumpt i on of the existence of a particular number be 
c ontradicted , then only the pos sibility of the exi stence of 
t he number will have been demonstrated . T o  be certain that 
a number really doe s  exi st , one must c onstruct the number 
explicitly , thereby changing the possibility into an actuality . 
1 .  Loui s O .  Katt soff , A Philosophy of Mathemat i c s  
( Ame s ,  Iowa , T h e  Iowa Stat e Colle ge Press-;-1949) , 116. 
2 .  !E.!f!· , 157 . 
3 .  �- ' 122 .  
4 .  .!!?.!!!· '  157 . 
-:?' . 
In addit i on ,  the intuit ionist s believe that knowledge 
of mathematical c oncept s  is gained immediately by intuit ion , 
and not throush the offi c e s  of symboli sm ,  so revered by 
t he formal i st s .  
However , it i s  in the realm of infini t e  set s where the 
views of the two schools differ so wi dely. In fact , in 
that realm , the schools are diametrical ly oppo sed t o  each 
other .  B e c ause the y l imit their rul e s  only t o  the c ondition 
of c onsi stency , the formali st s ,  in c ontending that con­
s i st ency impli e s  exi stenc e , ne c e s sari ly hold the Law of the 
Exc luded. Midd le to be appli cable always , even to situat i ons 
1 
c onc erned with an infinit e array of propositions . In order 
to apply the Law of the Excluded Middle to an infinite set ,  
the y  surely are a s sumi ng that ordinary two-value d l o "ic 
2 
obtain s . Aft er all , if a parti cular proposit i on is be li@Ved 
t rue , the fal sity of the other po s sibi lit i e s  relative to the 
proposition must have been pr evi ou sly e stabli shed . fhu s the 
f ormali st s are a ssuming that every member of the infinite set 
has to be e ither true or false . 
That a member of an infinite array must be e ither true 
or fal se is the ve ry point with whi ch the i ntuit i oni sts dis­
agx-ee , and they di sa,r:;ree vi ol ent ly . Ina smuch as not all 
members of an infini t e  set c an be examined, one by one , the 
t ruth or falsity of every member cannot be a s c e rt�ined. 
1.  Loui s O .  Katt soff , A Philo sophz of Mathemat i c s  
{ Ame s ,  Iowa , The I owa Stat e coIIege Press-;-1949) , 122 . 
2 .  Ac cording to t wo-valued logic , something i s  e ither 
t rue or fal se ; henc e , truth and falsity are the only pos ­
s ibi litie s .  
Therefore , when dealing wi th infinite set s ,  the intui t i oni st s  
maintain that a three -valued l o � c  i s  requi site ; that i s ,  
each member mu st b e  cat e go ri zed a s  one o f  these thre e : true , 
1 
fal s e , or " unde c i dable" . 
Apparently , t he intuit i on i st s  have a p o i nt , for un­
deniably , not all the members of an infi ni te set c an be 
t e st e d  or s c rut ini z ed .  Since not every member c an be studi e d , 
it i s  illogi c al to assert that every member i s  either true 
or false . Since the app l i c at i on of the idea of the " ex­
c lude d mi ddle" impli e s  just such test ing , it doe s not appe ar 
reasonable t o  c laim that any one point i s  true simply b e ·  
cause of it s being t h e  " m iddle" . For that matt er , the words 
exclude d middle c ould bear defining when used in c on j unct i on 
with set s not finite . The word middle se ems t o  i ndi cat e  
a group made u p  o f  a finit e  number of thi ngs . H ence , the 
use of the term in conne ction wi th an infinite number of 
ob j e c t s  i s  parado�i cal . 
On the other hand , the formali st s '  assert i on of t he 
truth of any statement not c ontradi cted oy an agre ed-upon 
set of po stulat e s  i s  ent i rely ac c eptable to us . In any 
variety of logi cal reasoning , a set of as sumpt ions deemed 
basi c  mu st be subscri oed t o  first . Onc e the ba s i c  as sump­
tions have ueen out line d ,  any propo s i t i on c on si st ent with 
1 .  Loui s O .  Kat t soff , A Philo sophy or Mathemat i c s  
( Ame s ,  I owa , The I owa State College Pre s s-;-1949) , 175.  
the "foundation tac ts" i s  c onsidere d true . At any rat e , 
such a proposi tion i s  true to the ext ent that the ba sic 
assumptions are true . Be cause of their empha si s on c on-
sisten c y , the formalist s feel that if the propo sition 
that no number with a spe c i fied propert y exi st s c an be 
shown to be c ontradicted , (when reference is made to 
the set of po stulate s  de eme d basic ) ,  then they can be 
a s sured that the number doe s  indeed exi st. 
On the matter of exi stenc e of numbers , we c annot go 
a long with the intuit i oni sts ' insist enc e on the ne c e s sity 
of c onstruction of the number . Perhaps the y mean by con--
atruction that the number mu st be exhibited or demon-
strated in some fashi on . However ,  surely appl i c ation of 
t he Law of the Exc luded Middle t o  a finite set c ould 
prove that a number with t he required property exi sts ,  
even though the numbe r  is not ident i f i e d  in any way. Of 
c our se , it c ould be that the intu itionist s are de fining 
e xist ence differently than their opponent s are defining 
the term .  
I n  behalf o f  the intuitionist s ,  though , their views 
r egarding infinite s e t s  are not on ly int ere sting , but s e em 
to make sound sense a s  we ll . We are alluding: espec ially 
to the thou.!!ht that c ontradicti on of the statement rel­
ative to non-existence impli es only the po ssibili tz that 
the oppo site i s  true . We keep thinking of how the absence 
of an alibi mer e ly indicat e s  the possibi lit y of the gu i lt 
of a suspect , not the actual guilt . Mayb e  the analogy i s  
i s  not t oa tar-fet ched t e  help bring out our point . 
Throughout the course of the se chapt ers , thi s  pap er 
h a s  dealt with the role of intuiti on in vari ous situa­
t ions .  Thus , throu gh de scripti on and i llustrat i on ,  in­
tuiti on has been shown t o  be intimately c onc erned not 
only with prob lem-solvin g ,  insi�ht , and geometry , but 
with the ultimat e foundat ions of mat hemat i c s  as well . 
A s  with the other three topi c s , the relat io n shi p of in­
tuition to foundati ons i s  a c ontroversial one ; at one 
pole , the fo rmali st s  a scribe knowl edge of s ymb ols to 
i ntui t i on , and at the other , the intuitioni sts , with 
e qual as suranc e ,  credit knowl e dge of the numbers them­
s e lve s  to intuition .  
Epilogue 
The mat h emati ci an , in a c cepting the challen�e of a 
problem , may summon various aids t o  meet the deman ds in­
volve d .  For one thing , h e  may seek i de a s  from pe ople 
who se sc holarship appear s  to merit c onfidence and who have 
s at i sf i e d  him a s  t o  their ab ility t o  apply c lear , reasonably 
o b j e ctive thinki ng to que sti ons . 
As another ai d ,  the mathemat i c ian may t ake mental ex­
c ursions into t he reasoni ng of vari ous writers . Of c ourse , 
t he se excur si ons ent ai l the heavy re sponsi bility for s ort ing 
o ut the ide a s  t hat appear pert i nent and int e rpret in� t he s e  
i deas i n  hi s own t erms . Aware of the r i s k  that i s  always 
i nvolved in attempt in� to int erpret the mind of another , 
h e  can only hope that the exercise of c are and di scre t i on 
will effe ct a fair re pre sent at ion . 
In t he third plac e ,  the mathemat i c ian may ,  and often 
d o e s  examine hi s own experi enc e s  a s  t eacher and student . 
That i s ,  he may try t o  re -tra c e  the thinking done in solving 
p art i cular problems . Such introspection i s  very diffi c ul t , 
f or what c ould be harder than t o  att empt t o  analyz e one ' s 
o wn  thinking? Sinc e , try as he wi ll , t h e  mathemat i c ian 
c annot di ssoc i ate himse lf from himself , he regards the task 
o f  s c rut ini z ing hi s own rea soning as hi s mo st diff i c ult 
assignment . Although aware that h i s  view of him s e lf may be 
gro s sly inac curate , he neverthe l e s s  forge s ahead in hi s 
e ffort s t o  unrav el the chain of thou ght s that have led him 
t o  a solution . An i ndividual endowed with int e nse curi o si t y , 
he would probably try to study h i s  thi nking even if there 
were no possible " practical" outcome, such as application 
of the method analyzed to future prob lems. 
Thus, when attacki n g  a new topic that i s  just obscure 
enough to provide the necessary challenge, the mathematician 
may call upon opinions of his teachers, writings he deems 
pertinent, and his own experiences as guides. 
After classifyi n� and interpreting the ideas assembled, 
he may lean bac k  in his chair with a kind of quiet elation 
over having found some sort of system in the ideas he has 
handled . Before long, however, he leans forward, reaching 
f or paper and pencil .  After all ,  just ahead is a new chall enge . 
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